

PHILIP II AND UPPER MACEDONIA

ONE of the most enigmatic figures in Macedonian history is Alexander of Lyncestis, son of Aeropus and son-in-law of the great Antipater.¹ During the reign of his royal namesake he achieved sensational prominence, deposed from his command of the élite Thessalian cavalry under suspicion of treasonable correspondence with the Persian court. Still more sensational, however, is his involvement in the murder of Philip II. Our sources are unanimous that together with his brothers, Heromenes and Arrhabaeus, he was party to the murder, but secured pardon by his immediate recognition of Alexander as king.² The immediate recognition is certain, the participation in the murder much less so. The death of Philip was followed by an extensive purge of the political enemies of his heir, and charges of conspiracy and assassination may have been one of the means of removing them. Such at any rate is the conclusion of the most recent scholarship, which interprets Philip's murder as a veiled *coup d'état* by the young Alexander, isolated and threatened by his father's recent remarriage.³ Alexander, it is argued, immediately liquidated his political rivals, and as justification he alleged that they had been privy to his father's murder, at the same time concealing his own parricide and giving a veneer of legality to a series of judicial murders. A hypothesis of this kind is impossible either to prove or to disprove, but objections can be made on grounds of general credibility against various pieces in the mosaic of evidence. In particular the interpretation of the role of the Lyncestian brothers seems to me at fault.

There is a persistent source-tradition that several murderers were incriminated after Pausanias had successfully carried out the assassination,⁴ and this tradition is presupposed by the fictitious question to Ammon put in Alexander's mouth by the vulgate tradition.⁵ On the other hand both Aristotle and Diodorus attribute the murder to the private initiative of Pausanias,⁶ and no fellow conspirators are mentioned. Worse, the sources diverge about the fate of Pausanias. Diodorus claims that he tripped in flight and was run through by his pursuers (16. 94. 4). The story is vivid and dramatic, perhaps excessively so; Berve sums it up as *dramatische Ausschmückung*.⁷ A completely different account is to be found in a papyrus epitome of indeterminate date and authorship.⁸ The opening of the first extant column is fragmentary, but the context is

¹ Berve, *Alexanderreich*, ii. 17-19 (nr. 37).

² Arr. 1. 25. 2; Curt. 7. 1. 6-7; Just. 11. 2. 2.

³ E. Badian (*Phoenix*, xvii (1963), 244 ff.) poses the question *cui bono?* and delineates convincingly the insecurity of Alexander's position in 337. C. B. Welles (Loeb edition of Diodorus, vol. viii, p. 101 n. 2) makes the stimulating suggestion that Pausanias, Philip's murderer, was killed to ensure his silence. The two hypotheses are amalgamated by J. R. Hamilton (*Greece & Rome*, xii (1965), 120 ff.).

⁴ Diod. 17. 2. 1; Just. 11. 2. 1; Arr. 1. 25. 1.

⁵ Diod. 17. 51. 2; Curt. 4. 7. 27; Plut. *Al.* 27. 3-4; Just. 11. 11. 9.

⁶ Diod. 16. 93. 3-94. Aristotle (*Pol.* 5. 1311^b2) explicitly places the murder in the category of personal, not political, attacks.

⁷ Berve, ii. 309 (nr. 614).

⁸ *P.Oxy.* 1798 = *FGrH* 148; cf. U. Wilcken, *SB. Berlin*, 1923, 151-7. Papyrologists are undecided whether the script is Hellenistic or post-Augustan (cf. Jacoby, *FGrH* ii D. 533). The work may have been fairly extensive. On the left margin of the second surviving column (l. 17, F 5-6) there is a stichometric sign $\overline{\Psi}$ indicating 2,300 preceding lines. This comes in the context of

clearly the aftermath of the murder of Philip in the theatre at Aegae. Someone (clearly Pausanias) is handed over to the Macedonians; [οὔτοι δ'] ἀπετυπάν[ισαν αὐτό]ν τὸ δὲ σῶμα[α τοῦ Φιλ]ίππου θερά[πουσι θάψ]αι παρέδωκ[ε]. This story is clearly irreconcilable with the tradition of Diodorus; here Pausanias is arrested and violently done to death by the Macedonian army assembly.¹ Now it is true that the other remains of the papyrus are of disputable value. Apart from scattered fragments relating to the sack of Thebes and the affair of Philip the Acarnanian, the extant, decipherable remains of the papyrus comprise only a scrappy and sensational account of the battle of Issus. Here there are several novelties. In his anxiety on the approach march Alexander resorts to invoking various sea gods and goddesses.² Darius in flight eats a scrap of bread from an oxherd, adding an edifying comment that all men are glad to live.³ Finally we have casualties given for both sides—1,200 Macedonian losses and 53,000 Persian,⁴ figures which are uniquely high for the Macedonians and uniquely low for the Persians. This last detail strongly impressed Wilcken, but it is not enough to inspire faith in the rest of the fragmentary narrative. Most of the details given are remote from any other source-tradition, and we have no reliable criteria to test their authenticity. Moreover the surviving portions of the papyrus are too fragmentary and disconnected to allow any general conclusions about its value as a historical source.

The papyrus then is unreliable evidence, but that does not mean that Diodorus' account of Pausanias' death should be taken without question. The last chapters of Diodorus 16—at least those dealing with Greek affairs—are one

the Granicus, and so it is inferred that the previous narrative was of considerable length and detail (so Wilcken, *op. cit.* p. 151 n. 2). One cannot, however, assume that the whole of the lost narrative was devoted to the youth of Alexander and his early regnal years, or even that the history covered the whole of the recto of the papyrus. The brevity of the Issus narrative suggests that the treatment of events elsewhere was not particularly discursive.

¹ Much obscurity arises from the word ἀποτυπ<μ>ανίζω. Wilcken (*op. cit.*, p. 152) interpreted the expression as crucifixion, and found corroboration in an anecdote of Justin (9. 7. 10), in which Pausanias is described as crucified by the time of Philip's funeral. Opinions have since changed, and LSJ Suppl., *ad loc.*, translate 'cudgel to death'. This seems to have been the standard mode of execution for heinous crimes at Athens (Lys. 13. 56, Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 45. 1, cf. *Σ. Ar. Plut.* 476: τύμπανα· ξύλα δι' ὧν τοὺς καταδικούς ἐτυπον; Photius s.v. τύμπανα), but the word seems to have been used in some contexts for any violent mode of execution (*Plut. Sull.* 6, *Mor.* 1049 D, Euseb. *HE* 5. 1. 47; cf. T. D. Barnes, *JRS* lviii (1968), 40, n. 91). The word is at least consistent with stoning to death by the Macedonian army assembly, which seems to have been the regular method of execution (*Curt.* 6. 11. 10 and 38

—*more patrio*). Crucifixion, however, is not impossible; the consensus of evidence is that Callisthenes died in this way (*Plut. Al.* 55. 9; *Arr.* 4. 14. 3 (Ptolemy)).

² This detail is unique; the subsequent reference to a night sacrifice is paralleled in Curtius (3. 8. 22). It is interesting that Alexander had offered sacrifices to Poseidon and the Nereids at the Hellespont crossing (*Arr.* 1. 11. 6), and there is no reason why he should not have invoked them before Issus, close at hand as they were (so Wilcken, *op. cit.*, p. 155). However, the absence of corroboration for such a striking detail tells strongly against its authenticity.

³ The phrasing indicates that the subject of the anecdote is Darius rather than Alexander (ἐχόντι ὑπ' ἀθραπευσίας . . . [δ] δὲ διὰ τὴν ἐνδ[εία]ν φαγών). It makes little difference, however, whether one refers the anecdote to Darius or Alexander (so Grenfell and Hunt, *P.Oxy.* xv. 134); it is still unattested elsewhere.

⁴ The figure for the Persian mercenary losses is missing in the papyrus, but even allowing a fairly substantial total the Persian casualties are by far the lowest in any source other than Justin, who gives 61,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry (11. 9. 10). The papyrus, it may be added, is the only source which volunteers a total for the mercenaries' losses.

of the most unreliable parts of the *Bibliothēke*. It is perhaps the firmest result of Diodoran source-criticism that the majority of his history of mainland Greece from book 11 onwards is excerpted from the work of Ephorus.¹ Now towards the end of book 16 (74–6) Diodorus gives us a vivid full-dress account of the siege of Perinthus (341/0), which heralded the final struggle between Philip and the Greek world. The narrative comes to a full close at the attack on Byzantium and here Diodorus adds a literary footnote (76. 5); τῶν δὲ συγγραφέων Ἐφωρος μὲν ὁ Κυμαῖος τὴν ἱστορίαν ἐνθάδε κατέστροφεν εἰς τὴν Περὶνθου πολιορκίαν. He then adds that Diyllus of Athens began the second *synthesis* of his history where Ephorus closed his narrative. The conclusion is almost irresistible that Diodorus drew from Ephorus' work until the siege of Perinthus and subsequently transferred to another source for the story of Philip's final settlement with the Greek world. Now the latter part of Diodorus 16 displays several unique traits. In particular, much of the narrative is constructed from the more familiar speeches of the Demosthenic corpus—the description, for instance, of the Athenian assembly held after Philip's seizure of Elatea is a transcription of one of the most famous passages in the *De Corona*.² But the use of Demosthenes is very superficial, and there is at least one major inaccuracy—the placing of the clash between Demosthenes and Python of Byzantium at the conference at Thebes shortly before Chaeronea.³ This encounter took place in Athens five years previously when Philip was making his abortive proposals to widen the terms of the Peace of Philocrates. There are other errors, most serious the notorious howler that after the abandonment of the siege of Byzantium Philip made peace with the Athenians and his other enemies in Greece (77. 3). It seems certain that Diodorus' source is late Hellenistic, compiled after the appearance of the standard redactions of the works of the Attic orators, and there are distinct affinities with the productions of the rhetorical schools; at least the misdating of the embassy of Python seems to have been a canonical error.⁴

The account of the death of Philip is typical of the more sensational type of Hellenistic historiography—πειρώμενος <ἐν> ἐκάστοις ἀεὶ πρὸ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν τῆναι τὰ δεινά. Everything is geared to emphasize the contrast between the success of Philip, consummated in his appearance at Aegae as *synthronos* of the Olympians, and his sudden assassination; *sedet rex in vertice, caveat ruinam*.⁵ The story is dressed up with a battery of riddling oracles and double-edged prophecies,⁶ and the scandalous story of the outrage to Pausanias is given at

¹ The first detailed analysis was by J. Volquardsen, *Untersuchungen über die Quellen der griechischen und sicilischen Geschichte bei Diodorus XI–XVI* (Kiel, 1868), summarized by Schwartz, *RE* v. 679–80 = GG, pp. 59–60. There has been little doubt since that Diodorus' narrative of Greek affairs in this period is taken directly or indirectly from Ephorus.

² Diod. 16. 84–85. 1 = Dem. 18. 169–178. Note also Diodorus' citation of Lycurgus' speech against Lysicles (88. 2).

³ Diod. 16. 85. 4, citing verbatim Dem. 18. 136; for the dating to 344/3 B.C. see Dem. 7. 20.

⁴ Schwartz, *RE* v. 682, adduces Aelius Aristides, 38. 483. 5 and 39. 503 f., where

Python is made to lead the embassy to Thebes. But it seems impossible that Python represented Philip on that occasion; Mar-syas, cited by Plutarch (*Demosth.* 18 = *FGrH* 135/6 F 20), stated that Philip's representatives to Thebes were Amyntas and Clearchus of Macedon with Daeochus and Thrasydaeus of Thessaly. There is, moreover, no mention of a Byzantine in Philochorus' list of nations comprising the embassy (*FGrH* 328 F 56).

⁵ Cf. 16. 93. 2—τηλικαύτης δ' οὔσης περὶ αὐτὸν ὑπεροχῆς καὶ πάντων ἐπαινούντων ἅμα καὶ μακαρίζόντων τὸν ἄνδρα παράδοξος καὶ παντελῶς ἀνέλπιστος ἐφάνη κατὰ τοῦ βασιλέως ἐπιβουλὴ καὶ θάνατος.

⁶ 16. 91. 2; 92. 2–3. A similarly ambiguous

titillating length. This is far from a reliable context, and the description of Pausanias' death cannot be accepted without question. The highly coloured story of his flight, fall, and killing could well be a dramatic exaggeration; perhaps the tradition was that Pausanias stumbled and was captured, and this has been altered to give a more exciting and dramatic close—the murderer himself murdered. Clearly the divergent account of the papyrus is not enough to justify dismissing Diodorus as a sensational exaggeration, but on the other hand there are no good grounds for accepting his account. The sources for Pausanias' death are, like the Lerians, all bad, and the manner of his death must remain a mystery.

We are left with the undisputed fact that after the death of Philip a number of purported murderers were executed, perhaps at the state funeral itself.¹ The problem remains whether the victims were collaborators of Pausanias and denounced after his capture, or whether they were purged for political motives, Philip's death serving as a pretext. Now the only victims named in the sources are the sons of Aeropus, Arrhabaeus and Heromenes. These are generally assumed to have been members of the royal house of Lyncestis,² and they have been represented as potential rivals of Alexander himself.³ Both claims, however, are difficult to substantiate. The fact that one of the sons of Aeropus is named Arrhabaeus does not prove that he was descended from the famous Arrhabaeus, king of Lyncestis in 424/3 and the coeval of Perdiccas II of Macedon. The name may have been common outside the royal house,⁴ just as in Macedon proper the name Perdiccas was by no means the perquisite of the Argead house. Nor is it conclusive that Alexander, son of Aeropus, is invariably entitled *ὁ Λυγκηστής* in the vulgate tradition;⁵ the use of the distinguishing epithet could be only to differentiate him from his royal namesake (Arrian uses only the patronymic, never describing him as 'the Lyncestian'). The Lyncestian brothers were certainly aristocrats but not necessarily of royal stock. However, even if they were affiliated to the royal house, there is no cogent reason for supposing that they were potential rivals of Alexander. The Macedonian throne had been occupied by members of the Argead house since the time of Alexander the Philhellene except for the brief usurpation of Ptolemy Alorites, and it seems highly implausible that dynasts from the small mountain state of Lyncestis could have gained preference over the surviving male Argeads, or even the senior echelons of the Macedonian nobility. Perdiccas and the sons of Machatas most probably came from the royal houses of Orestis and Elimiotis,⁶ a background at least as distinguished as that of the sons of Aeropus; yet there is nothing to indicate that they were ever considered potential rivals of Alexander.

response from the Sibyl of Erythrae is cited by the late Paroemiographers (Zeno-bius, 4. 78, Diogenianus, 5. 75, Apostolius, 9. 83).

¹ So Justin, 11. 2. 1; cf. Diod. 17. 2. 1; Plut. *Al.* 10. 8.

² Cf. Beloch, *iii*². 2. 77; Berve, *ii.* 17, 80, 169.

³ This is implied by Badian (*Phoenix* xvii (1963), 248) and stated as fact by Welles (op. cit., p. 350 n. 1).

⁴ We hear of another Arrhabaeus, the father of Neoptolemus and Amyntas (Berve, *nrs.* 59, 547); there is no reason other than

the name to identify him with the son of Aeropus.

⁵ Diod. 17. 32. 1; 80. 2; Curt. 7. 1. 5; 8. 8. 6; Just. 11. 7. 1. A parallel might be the non-Argead usurper, Ptolemy, son of Amyntas, who is referred to as *ὁ Ἀλωρίτης* (Diod. 15. 71. 1; 77. 5).

⁶ For Perdiccas see Curt. 10. 7. 8; Arr. 6. 28. 4; *Ind.* 18. 5. For the sons of Machatas see Berve, *ii.* 75–6 (nr. 143); the evidence linking them with the royal house of Elimiotis is no stronger or weaker than that linking the sons of Aeropus with the royal house of Lyncestis.

If the Lyncestians were not rivals or a threat to the throne, the most obvious explanation of their execution is that they actually had conspired to murder Philip. In that case it is highly improbable that Alexander had any hand in the elimination of his father. It would have been an act of rashness and clumsiness to rid himself of his fellow conspirators, at once running the risk of damaging public revelations. Of course it cannot be denied that both Alexander and his mother had much to gain by the removal of Philip and a purge of the faction of Attalus, and contemporaries must have been quick to speculate on the identity of those behind the assassination of Philip.¹ Slander would have sprung up almost immediately, and the probable result was the evolution of an official story that Pausanias was pursuing a private vendetta. Aristotle placed the assassination in the category of attacks upon the person of the ruler as opposed to those directed against the character of the rule (*Pol.* 1311^b₂). He states the motive baldly διὰ τὸ ἐᾶσαι ὑβρισθῆναι αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ Ἀτταλον. Plutarch too only mentions the fact of the insult and leaves Diodorus and Justin to fill in the details for us.² Now the more detail presented, the less plausible the story becomes;³ Philip is not the principal culprit in the insult to Pausanias, and the occasion of the offence—the campaign against Pleurias of Illyria—was some eight years before. The story looks like a desperate attempt to find a personal connection between Philip and his murderer and a remotely plausible motive for the assassination. The ultimate source of the story of the insult is certainly Olympias and Alexander who were popularly suspected of planning the murder, and Aristotle's restatement of the motive could be a deliberate attempt to vindicate his former pupil by giving some circulation to the officially pronounced version. Olympias and Alexander then were suspected of foul play and the murder certainly turned out to their advantage. However, the question 'cui bono?', as Cicero assures us, can point in more than one direction. Other people may have had good reason to murder Philip.

The origins of the murderers of Philip, whether actual or presumed, take us to the remote mountain kingdoms of Orestis⁴ and Lyncestis. Now in the fastnesses of the Pindus mountains there had existed before Philip a complex of independent kingdoms, which separated the Macedonian heartland from the Illyrian tribes of the north and the Molossian confederacy of Epirus. Lyncestis was the furthest north, bordering on Lake Lychnitis; immediately to the south was Orestis in the upper reaches of the Haliacmon, and to the south-east again in the lower reaches of the same river was Elimiotis. Immediately south of Elimiotis was the border kingdom of Tymphaea, while on the western side of the watershed Parauaea extended into the Aous valley. The geographers describe them as an entity—Upper Macedonia.⁵ All guarded independence jealously, protected as they were by mountain barriers, and all seem to have looked to neighbouring powers for protection against encroachment by the

¹ Plutarch (*Al.* 10. 6–7) claims that Olympias bore the brunt of the slander but Alexander was not free from suspicion. Justin goes further and claims as fact that Olympias had horses ready for Pausanias' escape and surreptitiously placed a crown on his crucified body, *quod nemo alius audere nisi haec superstitie Philippi filio potuisset* (9. 7. 9–10).

² Plut. *Al.* 10. 6 f.; Just. 9. 6. 4 ff.; Diod. 16. 93. 3–9.

³ Cf. Badian, art. cit., p. 247.

⁴ Pausanias came from Orestis—Diod. 16. 93. 3.

⁵ The best impression of the geographical position is given by Hammond, *Epirus* (Oxford, 1967), Maps 14 and 15. There is a useful summary of evidence by F. Geyer, *Makedonien bis zu Thronbesteigung Philipps II* (*Historische Zeitschrift*, Beiheft 19 [1930]), 11–15.

kings of Macedon. Indeed Strabo regards the Upper Macedonian kingdoms as of Epirote stock; 'Ἡπειρώται δ' εἰσὶ καὶ Ἀμφίλοχοι καὶ οἱ ὑπερκείμενοι καὶ συνάπτοντες τοῖς Ἰλλυρικοῖς ὄρεσι, τραχεῖαν οἰκοῦντες χώραν, Μολοττοὶ τε καὶ Ἀθαμᾶνες καὶ Αἰθίκες καὶ Τυμφαῖοι καὶ Ὀρέσται Παρωραῖοι τε καὶ Ἄτιντᾶνες, οἱ μὲν πλησιάζοντες τοῖς Μακεδόσι μᾶλλον, οἱ δὲ τῷ Ἰονικῷ κόλπῳ.¹ Elsewhere he claims that the Epirote peoples bordering on Thessaly and Macedon had been absorbed by their larger neighbours; these included Orestis, Pelagonia, and Elimiotis, which were annexed by Macedon.² Pelagonia was the territory immediately to the north of Lyncestis,³ and in the fourth century B.C. it may have formed part of Lyncestis. At least the Lyncestian noble, Menelaus son of Arrhabaeus, is termed ὁ Πελαγῶν in an Athenian decree of 362.⁴ In that case Strabo is claiming as Epirote all the peoples of Upper Macedonia. However, there seems little doubt that in the time of Philip and Alexander the upper kingdoms were regarded as an integral part of Macedon proper. Men like Perdiccas of Orestis and Polyperchon of Tymphaea⁵ were members of the inner circle of Alexander's ἐταῖροι. Even more significantly, three phalanx battalions were composed of men from Elimiotis, Lyncestis and Orestis, and Tymphaea,⁶ while horsemen from ἡ ἄνωθεν Μακεδονία formed a unit of the Macedonian cavalry.⁷ This contrasts strongly with the treatment of the neighbouring Paeonians, who were brigaded apart from the Macedonian forces. The upper kingdoms must have been felt to be of Macedonian extraction.

Strabo's claim then is erroneous that Upper Macedonia was originally Epirote, and the best explanation is that at some period this area was claimed as part of the Epirote alliance.⁸ Certainly there is evidence of political interconnection, particularly with Orestis. In 429/8 Antiochus of Orestis sent a contingent of 1,000 troops with the Parauaeon king, Oroedus, to join the invasion of Acarnania mounted by the Epirotes.⁹ On this occasion the Orestians are independent of both Epirus and Macedon, and their action is that of voluntary allies. Later the position altered. A recently discovered decree of the Molossian *koinon* lists fifteen *συνάρχοντες* from the various states of the alliance.¹⁰ These include an Orestian and a Parauaeon. The date of the inscription is uncertain, compatible with almost any period in the first half of the fourth century,¹¹ but it is clear that at some time Orestis was a member of the Molossian league. This could have been the result of pressure from Macedon; Orestis was forced to turn west for some guarantee against annexation.

¹ Str. 7. 7. 8 (326); cf. Hecataeus *FGrH* 1 F 107.

² Str. 9. 5. 11 (434).

³ Str. 7. 7. 8 (326-7) states that Pelagonia was part of the old area of Upper Macedonia, in the upper reaches of the Erigon by Lyncestis. (Ps.-Scymnus 621 also juxtaposes the areas.) The route taken by Philip V in 211 also implies that Pelagonia was to the north (Liv. 26. 25. 4). cf. Geyer, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

⁴ Tod, *GHI* ii. 143, l. 7 = *IG* ii². 110; cf. Tod, 148.

⁵ Berve, ii. nr. 654. Note also his list of attested domiciles (ii. 445 b).

⁶ Diod. 17. 57. 2 (cf. Curt. 4. 13. 28). Thucydides has no hesitation in calling the

Lyncestians, Elimiotians, and other mountain peoples Macedonian (2. 99. 2).

⁷ Arr. 1. 2. 5.

⁸ Hammond, *Epirus*, pp. 444 ff., argues that Strabo's ultimate source was Hecataeus of Miletus. Whether or not this is so, the passages refer to a period before Philip's incorporation of the upper kingdoms into the Macedonian state.

⁹ Thuc. 2. 80. 6.

¹⁰ First published by D. Evangelides, *Hel-lenica* xv (1957), 247 ff., and revised by Hammond, *Epirus*, pp. 527 ff.

¹¹ Evangelides merely dated the inscription before 330 B.C.; Hammond's restoration of the name of King Neoptolemus (p. 529) is avowedly speculative.

In the case of Lyncestis the evidence shows no political connection with Epirus,¹ but there is more attested hostility to Macedon. Indeed the royal house of Lyncestis makes its first appearance in history with Arrhabaeus, son of Bromerus, struggling for independence against Perdiccas of Macedon and his reluctant ally, Brasidas.² Now it is interesting that on this occasion Perdiccas' intended Illyrian allies changed sides without scruples and became the chief instrument for the ignominious expulsion of the Macedonian expeditionary force.³ Clearly the Lyncestians were on good terms with their northern neighbours, and, when the crisis came, they could divert them from their initial obligation to Perdiccas. The same pattern seems repeated in the reign of Archelaus, when (so a cryptic note of Aristotle informs us)⁴ the Macedonians were at war with Arrhabaeus and Sirrhas. Arrhabaeus is obviously a Lyncestian king, perhaps the son of the opponent of Perdiccas. Sirrhas, however, is a more enigmatic character. Strabo tells us that Eurydice, the mother of Philip, was Lyncestian on her mother's side and the daughter of Irrhas.⁵ This latter is identified with the Sirrhas of Aristotle, and the form of his name in Strabo seems the more authentic. Irrhas then was an ally of Lyncestis and married a Lyncestian princess. Attempts have been made to localize him in Upper Macedonia,⁶ but the evidence points more strongly to Illyria. His daughter, Eurydice, is described as *Ἰλλυρίς καὶ τρισβάρβαρος* by the sources, and I see no valid reason to deny that Irrhas was an Illyrian prince.⁷ In that case the temporary alliance of 423 was cemented by intermarriage: the Lyncestians and their Illyrian neighbours together resisted the power of Archelaus' resurgent Macedon. Lyncestis like Orestis was forced to an alliance with her nearest strong neighbour to buttress her precarious independence. Nothing more is heard of the history of Lyncestis. Even the annexation by Philip is obscure and undatable. The individual named in 362 as Menelaus the Pelagonian emerges as Menelaus the Athenian in an honorary decree passed by Ilium some time in the 350s.⁸ The general assumption is that Menelaus fled Lyncestis when the kingdom was annexed by Philip, finding refuge and *πολιτεία* in Athens.⁹ In that case the annexation was roughly contemporary with the war against Bardylis of Illyria, and it is not impossible that the Lyncestians had joined their old allies to help inflict the catastrophic defeat on Philip's predecessor, Perdiccas III.

¹ Apart from Strabo's claim that they were Epirote by origin we only hear of communications for trade (Diod. 11. 56. 3).

² Thuc. 4. 79. 2; 83; 124-6. Compare his brief earlier statement (2. 99. 2): *Μακεδόνων εἰσὶ καὶ Λυγκῆσαι καὶ Ἑλιμιῶται καὶ ἄλλα ἔθνη ἐπάνωθεν, ἃ ξύμμαχα μὲν ἔστι τούτοις καὶ ὑπέρκοα, βασιλείας δ' ἔχει καθ' αὐτά.*

³ Thuc. 4. 125.

⁴ Arist. *Pol.* 5. 1311^b12-14.

⁵ Str. 7. 7. 8 (326) *οἱ δὲ Λυγκῆσαι ὑπ' Ἀρραβαίου ἐγένοντο, τοῦ Βαγχιαδῶν γένους ὄντι — τούτου δ' ἦν θυγατρίδῃ ἡ Φιλίππου μήτηρ τοῦ Ἀμύντου Εὐρυδικῆς, Ἴρρα δὲ θυγάτηρ.*

⁶ Geyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 79-80 argues that Irrhas was king of Elimiotis; Beloch, *iii*². 2, 79 claims Orestis as his domicile. Both hypotheses rest on *a priori* arguments, not positive evidence.

⁷ Plut. *de lib. educand.* 20 (14 B), Libanius, *Vit. Demosth.* 9, Suda s.v. *Κάρανος*; cf. Momigliano, *Filippo il Macedone*, p. 30 n. 2. There seems to me no force in Beloch's counter-argument—'aber die makedonischen Herrscher haben sich wohl Nebenfrauen aus Illyrien geholt, aber nicht ihre Königinnen'.

⁸ Tod, *ii*. 148 = *SIG*³ 188.

⁹ There is no reason except the patronymic *Ἀρραβαίου* to suppose that Menelaus was ruler of Lyncestis. If *IG* ii². 1, 190 is correctly assigned to the archonship of Chion (so Ferguson, *Klio*, xiv (1915), 393 n. 5), Menelaus cannot have been king in 365/4; in that year *proxenia* and *euergesia* are awarded to *Π[... τὸν Π]ε[λαγόνων βα]σιλέα.*

The upper kingdoms then had a constant struggle to preserve their independence, and fostered alliances with the peoples to the west and north. On the other hand the policy of the kings of Macedon was to make the recalcitrant mountaineers truly *ξύμμαχα καὶ ὑπήκοα*. One line of approach was direct annexation, attempted disastrously by Perdiccas II and successfully by Philip. There were, however, other means of exerting political influence, and the most effective was intermarriage of the royal houses. The most celebrated exponent of the art of political marriage was of course Philip himself,¹ but his predecessors were no strangers to this method of diplomacy. It is a striking fact that the scanty data about Macedonian royal marriages before Philip lead us almost invariably to Upper Macedonia—particularly to Elimiotis, the nearest and possibly the most populous of the mountain kingdoms.² This policy can be traced back to the mid fifth century and Alexander the Philhellene. A gloss on Thucydides yields the information that Derdas of Elimiotis was the cousin of Alexander's two sons, Perdiccas and Philip;³ it is a reasonable inference that Alexander took one of his wives from Elimiotis. Towards the end of the century Archelaus married his elder daughter to an unnamed king of Elimiotis.⁴ This marriage was arranged at a time of crisis when Archelaus was held at full stretch by the alliance of Irrhas and Arrhabaeus, and the move was presumably designed to prevent a coalition between Elimiotis and her northern neighbour, Lyncestis. How successful the marriage proved is an insoluble problem. All that can be said is that Derdas of Elimiotis was ready and willing to join the Spartan expedition to assist Macedon against Olynthus in 382. His motive may have been what Xenophon insinuates—fear of Olynthian expansion,⁵ but it is conceivable that Derdas felt some loyalty to Macedon thanks to the marriage ties with Alexander I and Archelaus.

There are ties attested with Lyncestis too. About 390 Philip's father, Amyntas, married Eurydice, daughter of the Illyrian prince, Irrhas, and granddaughter of Arrhabaeus of Lyncestis.⁶ This was certainly a marriage *κατὰ πόλεμον*. Shortly after the beginning of his reign Amyntas was driven from his throne by an Illyrian invasion, and the subsequent marriage to the Illyrian Eurydice looks like an attempt to conciliate the invaders after his restoration by the Thessalians.⁷ Lyncestis probably co-operated with the Illyrian invaders

¹ Satyrus *ap.* Athen. 13. 557 B—*ὁ Φίλιππος αἰεὶ κατὰ πόλεμον ἐγάμει*.

² Elimiotis seems to have supplied an entire phalanx battalion (Diod. 17. 57. 2).

³ Scholiast to Thuc. 1. 57. 3; it is invariably (and correctly) assumed that the Derdas in Thucydides is of the same family as the Derdas who is named in Xenophon as τὸν τῆς Ἑλιμίας ἄρχοντα (*Hell.* 5. 2. 38). The treaty of alliance between Athens and Perdiccas II, almost certainly datable to 423/2 (*SEG* x. 86 = Bengtson, *Staatsverträge*, nr. 186), mentions a [Δέ]ρδας βασιλ[εύς] as one of the signatories (l. 61).

⁴ Arist. *Pol.* 5. 1311^b11 ff.

⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 5. 2. 38; cf. 5. 2. 12; Diod. 15. 19. 2.

⁶ Str. 7. 7. 8 (326), Just. 7. 4. 4–5; for the date see Beloch iii². 2, 66.

⁷ On the vexed question of chronology see

V. Costanzi, *Klio* vi (1906), 297 ff. Beloch, iii². 2, 57 f., Geyer, pp. 112 ff., Momigliano, p. 31 n. 1. Diodorus dates Amyntas' expulsion by Illyrian raiders to 393/2, the second year of his reign (14. 92. 3). He adds that Amyntas was restored μετ' ὀλίγον χρόνον with Thessalian support, having given his border lands to the Olynthians for defence. As Geyer observes, this is a note inserted from Diodorus' main historical source, which certainly dated the expulsion within a few years of Amyntas' accession. The subsequent difficulties raised over the 'doublet' in Diod. 15. 19. 2 seem to me unreal. Diodorus is explaining the reasons for Amyntas' appeal to Sparta in 383/2, and he merely gives a resumptive note, explaining that the border lands had been surrendered in the crisis of the Illyrian invasion and that Amyntas was now attempting to recover them. There is no

as before in the war against Archelaus;¹ the chaos in Lower Macedon at the accession of Amyntas was an ideal time to avenge the annexation attempted by Perdiccas and probably by Archelaus. Amyntas certainly was forced to adopt a policy of reconciliation. Some measure of peace with the mountain peoples was achieved by the political marriage with Eurydice, and he could concentrate on restoring his hold on the Macedonian heartland between the Axios and the Haliacmon.

Amyntas' son, Philip II, was faced with an identical problem after the Illyrian invasion of 360; Macedon proper had to be secured from attack from the western mountains. Philip's massive victory over the Illyrian king Bardylis made the problem easier. Unlike his father he could negotiate from strength, and as a result of the Illyrian victory the upper kingdoms could be incorporated into Macedon proper without serious resistance. At the same time he negotiated a number of diplomatic marriages. Audata of Illyria may well have been his first wife; the product of their union, Cynane, was married to Philip's nephew, Amyntas, by the end of the reign,² and the marriage must have been roughly contemporary with the struggle against Bardylis. In that case it seems certain that Philip combined intermarriage with military victory to annul the threat from Illyria. About the same time as the settlement of Illyria came the annexation of Upper Macedonia, and we hear that Philip married Phila, sister of Derdas and Machatas. According to Satyrus this was a diplomatic marriage, and the name Derdas points unequivocally to Elimiotis. It follows that at the same time as the annexation Philip married into a royal house of Upper Macedonia, foreshadowing in his marital policy the political fusion that was to come. The duration of these marriages and the status of the princesses concerned is a matter for speculation. The important thing is that Philip's household was dominated after 357 by Olympias of Molossia,³ whose son, Alexander,

reason to posit a second Illyrian invasion; the emphasis in this second passage is on the feud with Olynthus, and the dispute is explained as having originated ten years before in the Illyrian crisis. Xenophon (*Hell.* 5. 2. 12) says nothing about the Illyrians, his concern being to present Olynthian aggression in its most lurid colours so as to justify the Spartan expedition of 382; the original *gift* of the border lands was best omitted. The insoluble problem is how long Amyntas was in exile after the Illyrian raid of 393/2. At that time he was replaced by a pretender named Argaeus (*pace* Geyer, the usurpation must be dated immediately after the Illyrian invasion; there is no evidence for a *second* expulsion). Diodorus says that there was a tradition of an usurpation of two years (14. 92. 3, repeated by the chronographers—cf. Beloch *iii*². 2, 51); this is at variance with the statement in his main historical source that the exile was short-lived. However, even allowing a two-year exile, Amyntas would have been back in Macedon by 391/0 in ample time to marry Eurydice. Isocrates, as so often, adds nothing but confusion with his rhetorical statement in the *Archidamus*

(6. 46) to the effect that Amyntas was deprived of virtually his whole kingdom by the barbarians, and after sending for Spartan help recovered his entire realm *ἐντὸς τριῶν μηνῶν*. There is nothing here about the dispute with Olynthus, only a vague statement about a barbarian invasion and a quick recovery with Spartan help (perhaps confused with the Thessalian restoration). A vague historical parallel put in Archidamus' mouth to encourage the Spartans in their resistance to Thebes cannot be pressed against the largely coherent narrative of Diodorus, based as it is on the work of Ephorus. I conclude that there was only one major Illyrian invasion, which occurred shortly after Amyntas' accession.

¹ Geyer, p. 111, argues on *a priori* grounds that the Lyncestians were overrun by the Illyrians. There is no evidence for this.

² Cf. Arr. *Succ.* F 1, 22–3, Berve, ii, nr. 456 (*Κυννάνη*).

³ Alexander was born in 356, about the time of an Olympic festival (Plut. *Al.* 3. 8). Olympias then married Philip before autumn 357 (so Beloch, *iii*². 2, 68).

was the acknowledged crown prince. Now Upper Macedonia had traditional ties with Epirus, and Orestis in particular had formed part of the Molossian *koinon* in the generation before Philip. This marriage with Olympias may have been more important than a straightforward diplomatic union with the Epirote royal family. The two powers to the east and west of the Pindus range were now allied in marriage, and any progeny would be hybrid—so Attalus was to remark later. Formerly recalcitrant, the Upper Macedonian kingdoms seem to have been more reconciled to a dynasty which was to prove half Epirote. At least by the end of Philip's reign three of the six phalanx battalions were recruited from the upper kingdoms, and many of the *ἐταῖροι* in the immediate entourage of Alexander can be traced to the same origins. Even if there was no feeling of Macedonian unity as yet, the upper tribes were willing to be incorporated into the military and social organization of Philip II.

In 337 the situation changed abruptly. Philip took another wife, Cleopatra, and the immediate result was a dynastic quarrel. Alexander deposited his mother in her native Epirus while he himself retired to Illyria.¹ This virtual exile was preceded by a bitter brawl with Cleopatra's uncle, Attalus, who had looked forward to the birth of 'legitimate' heirs for Philip; "*νῦν μέντοι γνήσιοι*" *ἔφη* "*καὶ οὐ νόθοι βασιλεῖς γεννηθήσονται*".² The reference to legitimate heirs must mean that Cleopatra came from Lower Macedon; Attalus sneers at the Molossian ancestry of Alexander, much as Curtius makes Ptolemy sneer at the Asian birth of the sons of Barsine and Rhoxane (10. 6. 13). Alexander's response to the taunt was predictably violent. He challenged his father and retired to an uneasy and uncertain future.³ Others, however, may have felt equally insecure. The royal house of Macedon was no longer a blend between east and west but a dynasty of the plain, and the Upper Macedonians, so far acquiescent in the rule of Philip, may have felt threatened with eclipse and subjection rather than incorporation in the regime. At any rate, when Philip fell at Aegae, his assassin was Pausanias of Orestis and the Lyncestian sons of Aeropus were alleged to have joined the conspiracy. It looks as though the nobles of Upper Macedonia were not prepared to be ruled by a junta from the lower plain and acted accordingly. Beyond this the motives of the conspirators are impossible to disentangle. We have only the fact that Alexander, son of Aeropus, acknowledged his namesake as king immediately and secured pardon while his brothers were executed as regicides. This points to dissension among the conspirators themselves, united in the move to eliminate Philip but at variance about the moves to be taken subsequently. One thinks of the sequel to the death of Caligula. Why Alexander's brothers did not follow suit in hailing the rising star is a question for ever unanswerable. Perhaps they had schemes of reasserting the independence of the upper kingdoms and destroying the system laboriously constructed by Philip. On the other hand Alexander was the son-in-law of Antipater, Philip's senior minister, and he had an interest in preserving the Macedon of Philip in its entirety; hence the immediate declaration for Philip's half-Epirote son, the tangible product of the attempted fusion of the mountain states. Whether Antipater himself was party to the conspiracy is again an unanswerable question; there is no reliable

¹ Plut. *Al.* 9. 11. Badian, art. cit., p. 244 n. 8, suggests that Alexander's host in Illyria was Langarus, king of the Agrianians.

² Athen. 13. 557 D; Plut. *Al.* 9. 7; Just. 9. 7. 3.

³ Cf. Badian, art. cit., pp. 245 f.

evidence for his activities at this period,¹ and his son-in-law may have acted on his own initiative.

One thing is certain. Alexander's position after his father's death was desperately insecure. His standing as crown prince had been shaken by the catastrophic Cleopatra marriage and he had rivals in the Argead house itself. Amyntas, son of Philip's brother and predecessor Perdiccas, was still alive and a potential rival. Harmless in Philip's reign, he could still be used as a pawn against Alexander in the immediate chaos after the assassination. Later Philotas was to be accused of assisting Amyntas to attempt the life of the new king,² and the accusation may have some substance. Philotas' sister had been married to Attalus in the last years of Philip's reign, and according to Curtius Philotas admitted at his trial that he had been friendly with Amyntas.³ There is a connection between Amyntas and the Attalus faction, and the reality behind the allegations made in 330 may be that Attalus' supporters backed Amyntas against the crown prince—the threat being serious enough to be represented as a conspiracy. At the very least Amyntas had enough backing to make his removal a political necessity for Alexander at the outset of his reign.⁴

On the other hand there must have been considerable pressure from the upper kingdoms to break away completely. The timely recognition by Alexander the Lyncestian must have been as providential as the sources imply, and he may have been instrumental in securing the support of the army. Obscurity shrouds every move in the drama of the succession, but it seems clear that Alexander had a hard fight to secure the throne,⁵ and any allies would have been welcome. As it turned out, acknowledgement by the army gave him a breathing space. Pausanias' chief collaborators, including the Lyncestian brothers, were executed,⁶ and Alexander seems to have had no trouble from the rank-and-file Lyncestians. Separatism, if it existed, would have been the preoccupation of the nobility; to the phalanx soldier it can have made little difference whether he was ruled by Alexander or Arrhabaeus. Accordingly after the elimination of the principal conspirators there was general acquiescence to the rule of Alexander, by birth half Epirote and uniting in his person the ruling dynasties on both sides of the Pindus. The faction of Attalus in

¹ Berve, ii. 46 (nr. 94), cites the Alexander Romance for the story of Antipater hailing Alexander immediately after his father's murder, and Badian (p. 248) accepts the detail. However, the account of Philip's murder in the Alexander Romance (Ps.-Call. 1. 24 ff.) is pure fantasy, and it is arbitrary to select one detail out of the farrago as authentic.

² Curt. 6. 9. 17: *Hic Amyntae, qui mihi consobrinus fuit et in Macedonia capiti meo impias comparavit insidias, socium et conscium adiunxit* (cf. 6. 10. 24).

³ Curt. 6. 10. 24; cf. Badian, p. 245.

⁴ Cynnane, the ex-wife of Amyntas, was betrothed to Langarus, king of the Agrianians, in 335 shortly before the invasion of the Thebaid (Arr. 1. 5. 4). Amyntas must have been already dead, and the most probable assumption is that he was liqui-

dated immediately after Alexander's accession.

⁵ Plutarch (*de Al. fort.* 1. 327 c) lists Alexander's difficulties before the Asiatic campaign and states: *πᾶσα δ' ὑπουργία ἦν Μακεδονία πρὸς Ἀμύνταν ἀποβλέπουσα καὶ τοὺς Ἀερόπου παῖδας*. This is the sole evidence that Alexander's accession was a stormy period at home, but it seems a roughly accurate description of the chaos which must have ensued after Philip's murder.

⁶ The details of their arrest are unknown, but there is certainly no evidence for Badian's dramatic statement (p. 248)—'The two brothers who were supposed to have procured Philip's assassination were taken entirely by surprise and presented themselves as meek and helpless victims to his successor.'

Macedon, including his niece, Cleopatra, was quickly liquidated,¹ and Attalus himself assassinated despite appeals to Alexander. These murders were remembered and included in subsequent indictments of the king, but for the present they were received at least with tolerance. Macedonians knew and understood the art of political murder.

Meanwhile the assassination of Philip remained, an ugly incident that required explanation. The crown prince was saved from eclipse by the murder, and rumour was bound to incriminate him with his mother. Moreover it would not pay to advertise the fact that Philip had been eliminated by a faction from Upper Macedonia. Greece was volatile enough in 336, and the result of broadcasting news of dissension in Macedonia might have been to unite the coalition of Chaeronea. The delicate state of allegiance in the upper kingdoms was an *arcanum imperii*. Accordingly the story of Pausanias' vendetta was concocted and presently promulgated as fact by Aristotle in the *Politics*. Subsequently historians of the calibre of Diyllus and Duris could add their own variations to a piquantly sensational story. Unfortunately the details were not convincing enough to command assent in ancient or modern times, and Alexander has proved unable to escape allegations of parricide. The truth is less dramatic but of more far-reaching consequences historically.

There is another relevant fact. Alexander left Macedon in 334 without either a wife or an heir. Parmenion and Antipater, we are told, had advocated marriage and procreation before embarking on the Asiatic campaign, but Alexander shrugged off the proposal.² The advice was sensible enough, for the Argead house was decimated, and any accident to Alexander would have had catastrophic consequences, leaving Macedonia the prey of warring pretenders. We have no reason to question the motives either of Parmenion or of Antipater, though both had marriageable daughters and both no doubt had ambitions of an alliance with the royal house. The need for a recognized heir was a major priority, and any adviser, disinterested or not, might have recommended immediate marriage. But Alexander refused, and, if the analysis of the circumstances of Philip's assassination is correct, he had ample justification for his refusal. A marriage with a wife from the lower plains would exacerbate the upper peoples and risk revolt, while marriage with a princess from Upper Macedonia might abrade feelings among the remnants of Attalus' supporters. Any marriage would have provoked discontent, and at the delicate period of the succession discontent might prove fatal. Whether or not Alexander made the right decision is a moot point, but there seems more reason for his refusal to marry than is implied by the empty rhetoric put in his mouth by Diodorus.

In effect Alexander did not take a wife until 327, and then the problems of Macedonia proper had receded into the background. He was now King of Kings, the heir of the Achaemenids, and the wife he took belonged to the Iranian nobility. In the earlier years of his reign the problems of Macedon had prevented a marriage, but by 327 Macedon was no longer Alexander's chief preoccupation. What the feelings of the men of the upper kingdoms were to the marriage with Rhoxane cannot be evaluated, for we hear no more of regional

¹ Berve, ii. nr. 182 (*Ἀτταλος*). N.B. Justin, 11. 5. 1; *proficiscens ad Persicum bellum omnes novercae suae cognatos, quos Philippus in excelsoiorem dignitatis locum provehens imperiis praefecit, interfecit*. The purge must have been extensive.

² Diod. 17. 16. 2. The incident is unattested elsewhere, but Aristobulus claimed that Parmenion advised the king to form a liaison with the captive Barsine after Issus (Plut. *Al.* 21. 7 = *FGH* 139 F 11).

feeling in Hellenistic Macedon. There is, however, one interesting piece of evidence. In 196 B.C. the Roman *decemviri* declared the people of Orestis independent because they had adhered to the Roman cause in the recent war against Philip V.¹ Never strong, the Orestian allegiance collapsed under pressure. A century had passed since the death of Philip II, but Orestis, it seems, still did not consider itself an integral part of Macedonia. Disregard of local feelings in Upper Macedonia cost Philip his life and set his dynasty in jeopardy. Furthermore despite all his attempts at fusion the incorporation of the mountain kingdoms proved ultimately unsuccessful.

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¹ Polyb. 18. 47. 6; cf. Liv. 39. 23. 6. that the Orestian defection came in the truce of 198/7 (so Hammond, *Epirus*, p. 620). Walbank in his commentary ad loc. suggests